Modernization, national, and world-system theories compete to explain the lack of nonelite well-being in the Third World (So 1990). In particular, the three perspectives have different implications for the treatment of workers by various types of firms in the Third World, namely transnational enterprises (TNEs), national private interprises (NPEs), and national governmental enterprises (NGEs). The present study uses the three theories to develop hypotheses about the outcomes of labor- actions against the three types of employers. It then tests the hypotheses with a sample of labor-actions conducted in the developing market nations of Asia and concludes with some refinements to the theoretical debate.

According to modernization theory, Third World nations have failed to develop because of incomplete modeling on First World nations. To the extent that such imitation occurs, nations will modernize. The greater the integration of poor nations with rich ones, especially with the latter's TNEs, the greater the progress (see Quester 1991). Although elites may profit more than nonelites in the process, all will eventually benefit as economic and political development ensues (Dodd 1972).

Among the primary agents of progress are TNEs. They alone have the requisite technology, expertise, global market connections, and other advantages to maximize the efficiency of production. The greater the openness of the Third World to TNEs, and the less the regulation of their activities, the higher the level of development (see Inkeles and Smith 1974).

In particular, TNEs are a force for the well-being of Third World nonelites. In the First World, large enterprises have recognized the rights of nonelites; as a result, labor-management relations have become increasingly harmonious. Compared to workers in the Third World, those in the First World receive more concessions and suffer less repression (see Fukuyama 1991). TNEs are enlightened, too, in their dealings with workers at Third World subsidiaries. Workers at TNEs appear to constitute a labor aristocracy (see Kowalewski 1987).

TNEs also have economic reasons for advancing the interests of their Third World workers. Because of size, efficiency, and profitability, they have the resources to grant concessions. Because of the risks of operating in unfamiliar environments, they are reluctant to apply repression (Madden 1977). National firms are less well endowed and less subject to such constraints (Lim 1990). One study (Pearson 1985) concluded that TNEs perform more responsibly than national firms with respect to health and safety, the environment, and other issues.

According to national theory, development results from the autonomy of indigenous leaders, not from their subordination to foreign ones. When elites independently pursue the interests of their nations in competition with other nations, the well-being of all nations is advanced (Morgenthau 1967). First World nations developed precisely because they stubbornly pursued their national autonomy.

The indigenous elites of the Third World emerged from decolonization struggles imbued with nationalistic sentiments (Emerson 1960). A coalition of elites and nonelites enabled the secural of independence from the First World. Decolonization cemented a national class alliance, while shattering the alliance of metropolitan and local-collaborationist elites (Shafer 1984). A supra-class identification with the nation was forged, which muted class conflict (Silvert 1963). National elites in the Third World have the well-being of nonelites at heart as they pursue the interests of their nations in the global marketplace. The principle of national sovereignty reigns supreme (Mayall 1990).

Because of technological backwardness, however, TNE investment may be necessary as a temporary evil. Yet Third World elites retain their nationalism. Relations with TNEs can never be completely harmonious, because their interests conflict (Kudrle 1985). Third World elites and TNEs are competitors in a "national friction structure" which has become increasingly antagonistic over time (Johns 1984). The interests of TNEs lie outside the nation. TNEs have little sympathy with their hosts and little desire to expand effective economic demand by means of higher wages and other concessions. They are often more powerful than national governments and firms, which are greatly dependent on their technology; TNEs know this and demand non-interference in their operations. TNEs can deny concessions and apply repressions with relative impunity. NPEs and NGEs are less alienated from their employees; their nationalism is a source of nonelite well-being. Indeed Third World nationalism, even in market economies, is usually of a socialistic variety, which suggests especially favorable treatment of workers at national firms (Roeder 1984).

According to world-system theory, Third World nations have failed to develop because of the capitalist world-market which has persisted over the past five centuries (Wallerstein 1976). Decolonization never happened. Rather a more sophisticated set of arrangements, neocolonialism, was instituted to cloak the continued inequality. The domination of the First World over the Third has remained intact. Among the primary agents of this domination are TNEs. They are not a stimulant to development but a retardant (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). They invest in the Third World to take advantage of its weaknesses and maximize profits, not to foster liberal enlightenment.

There is no authentic Third World nationalism either-- despite the rhetoric. Third World elites, by necessity or design, must cut deals with capitalist world-market elites. In the process, national interests are betrayed to those of the First World, which can offer a plethora of positive and negative incentives to corrupt any nationalist sympathies. Third World elites create a favorable investment climate for TNEs in return for "questionable payments," directorships, and other emoluments (Kowalewski and Leitko 1987). They do not pursue a national multi-class interest but a transnational elite-class one. They are junior-partner comprador capitalists in symbiotic relationship with TNEs.

It is global capitalism itself, whether backward and local or modern and transnational, which accounts for the lack of nonelite well-being in the Third World. TNEs, NPEs, and NGEs are fellow capitalists and treat their workers accordingly. There is only one system worth taking seriously, the capitalist world- system of transnational classes.

From these considerations the following hypotheses can be derived about the outcomes of labor-actions at the three types of firms. According to modernization theory, TNEs have greater enlightenment, more resources, and stronger incentives than national firms to treat their workers well. Thus, workers at TNEs will attain more favorable outcomes during labor-actions than workers at NPEs or NGEs. According to national theory, TNEs follow their own interests, while national firms are more likely to have the interests of their conational nonelites at heart. Thus, workers at TNEs will attain less favorable outcomes than those at NPEs and NGEs. According to world-system theory, all enterprises in the Third World, whether foreign or national, follow similar capitalist norms. Thus, workers at TNEs, NPEs, and NGEs will attain similar outcomes.

A sample of 310 labor-actions against firms in 15 industries in 15 developing Asian market nations between 1970 and 1990 was collected from a variety of sources. A set of dependent variables was constructed to measure outcomes for workers, i.e., the benefits and costs which resulted from the actions. Benefits were measured by concessions from management to workers' demands, which included improvement in working conditions, nonwage compensation, cessation to repression, unionization, and wage compensation. Costs were measured by the absence of repression, which included firings, injuries, detentions, and coerced return to work.

An independent variable was then constructed to represent the type of ownership/control of the firm at which the action occurred: (1) TNE; (2) NPE; or (3) NGE. Cramer's V was used to gauge the strength of assocation for the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Small and statistically insignificant V's indicate minimal differences among the firms; large and significant ones, substantial differences. Since the cases were nonrandomly selected, the tests are meant to be suggestive rather than definitive.

Labor-actions in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea were included with those in the less affluent market economies. These nations display many of the characteristics of the underdevelopment syndrome: domination of advanced sectors by foreigners, trade dependencies, political authoritarianism, foreign military forces, etc. However, for many reasons the GNPs of these "Four Dragons" have grown faster. Hence, these countries might be regarded by some observers as developed rather than underdeveloped. To control for the possibility that the findings could be distorted by combining cases from the two kinds of nations, the data were also partitioned into two subsets of cases and statistical tests conducted for the relationships to see if different patterns emerged.

The data support the hypothesis of world-system theory more than those of the other two perspectives. All the V's are small, and only for the relationships with large N's are any of the coefficients significant (see Tables 1 and 2).

With respect to concessions, no significant differences emerged among firms. The world-system hypothesis is fully supported.

With respect to repression, no significant difference was found with regard to coerced return to work. However, with regard to firings, TNEs were more repressive. On the other hand, TNE workers were significantly less likely to suffer injuries and detentions; and among the national firms, NPEs proved more repressive toward their conational workers than NGEs. Hence, with regard to coerced return to work, all the firms behaved as world-system capitalists. But with regard to firings, injuries, and detentions, the firms behaved in a more varied pattern.

In short, the findings for repression offer a mixed pattern of support for the three theories. The world-system hypothesis is confirmed with respect to coerced return to work; the national, with respect to firings; and the modernization, with respect to injuries and detentions.

Space disallows a presentation of findings for the two partitioned subsets of cases. The relationships for both the affluent and non-affluent subsets of cases were almost identical to those for the combined set of cases; no significant differences among firms were evident in spite of variation in the nations' development.

The data tend to support the hypothesis of world-system theory. In most respects, the theory correctly takes into account the capitalist nature of employers, regardless of their degree of global extension. All three types of firms behaved capitalistically and revealed a similar class-antagonism to workers in terms of concessions and coerced return to work. This antagonism is global. It includes TNEs, who bring their classism to the Third World and take advantage of nonelite weaknesses. It also includes NPEs and to a lesser extent NGEs, whose classism overrides nationalism in most respects when conational workers initiate challenges.

Modernization and national theories fare less well, but may have some insights to offer. Modernization theory may explain why TNEs, with their greater profitability and more routinized industrial relations, are less prone to apply the more serious forms of repression. National theory may explain why workers at TNEs were more likely to escape severe repression; national governments may have been reluctant, for political reasons, to detain and injure workers at foreign TNEs.

World-system theory, however, appears to gloss over the unwillingness of TNEs, with their different location in the global market structure, to apply the most serious forms of repression. Presumably, TNEs feel vulnerable in unfamiliar environments and are reluctant to arouse anti-colonial feelings with severe reprisals against workers. They may also be less able to enlist national governments to repress workers, because of the latter's anti-colonialism or political vulnerability to charges of collaboration with foreign employers. Further, TNEs have a global-market image to protect; eschewing severe repression may be viewed as cost-effective when worldwide profits are concerned.

Modernization theory, for its part, overstates the ability of TNEs to be a force for enlightenment. It underestates the willingness of TNEs to fire workers and coerce them back to work. TNEs have little problem in applying their own--softer--forms of repression in the Third World.

National theory ignores the fact that NPE employers are capitalists, indeed highly pressured and struggling ones, and thus willing to apply severe repression. NPEs may be nationalist with respect to foreign TNEs, but are distinctly capitalist with respect to conational workers. Likewise, national governments have little compunction about repressing workers for their private capitalist conationals.

In sum, while world-system theory has more utility than the other perspectives, it seems to require greater sensitivity to variation in the world-market location of the firms. TNEs have more economic resources, because of their world-market profits, to attract and train new workers after dissident workers are fired. They bring more routinized industrial relations with them to the Third World. NPEs, by comparison, have to struggle just to survive and have less experience in coopting workers; they are more willing to repress severely. NGEs, for their part, are perhaps less willing than NPEs to repress their workers severely because of structural location. They have to maintain essential national services; and government employers are often allied to their workers via political patronage.