Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY: A REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL MIGRATION CRISIS: CHALLENGE TO STATES AND TO HUMAN RIGHTS BY MYRON WEINER by Wesley D. Chapin
	INTRODUCTION International migration has occurred throughout human history, resulting in positive and negative effects, including internal and external security concerns, for both sending and receiving countries. Some states, most notably the "classical immigration countries" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), have welcomed the influx of people throughout much of their histories. These states have, at times, also been very exlusionary. For instance, the United States passed the National Origins Act of 1924, which gave preference to immigrants from European states and helped to exlude, effectively, many non-whites who wished to immigrate (Bouvier and Gardner 1986). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada also passed legislation to limit immigration through the use of quotas and immigration taxes (Foreman-Peck 1993). Immigrants to these classical immigration countries, and other countries have brought valuable ideas, resources, labor, and cultural diversity, among other things. Undoubtedly, these contributions have often been very beneficial. (For an excellent introduction to the arguments regarding the positive contributions of immigrants, consult Simon, 1989 and 1996). However, over the last three decades immigrants have become increasingly unwelcome in many states, both rich and poor. As Anthony Messina pointed out as early as 1990, any government that proposes to increase immigration is likely to experience a backlash from its citizens. This appears to be the result of several developments. The strong international economic growth that occurred in the decades after the Second World War led to the recruitment of millions of labor immigrants, or guestworkers, by countries in Europe, North America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. These guestworkers were welcomed, at least initially, by many groups in the host societies, including business and labor groups (Piore, 1979). However, the 1973 Oil Shock signaled an economic downturn that dramatically reduced the demand for immigrant labor globally. Since then, governments have made it much more difficult for people to immigrate legally. Partially because of the changing economic conditions and because of political and ethnic persecution, increasingly larger numbers of refugees and asylum seekers have sought safe havens in countries across the globe. Because these individuals tend to come from relatively poorer and usually less-developed or war-torn states than was previously the case, they often need assistance and are sometimes perceived as burdens or threats. (The end of the Cold War has also increased opportunities for peiople to emigrate from many former communist states to the West). At times, conflict between natives and "foreigners" has occurred – witness the violence that took place in Germany between natives and asylum seekers during the early and mid-1990s (McLaren, 1999). In addition, anti-immigration movements and parties have arisen, such as the Front National in France, which have successfully tapped into anti-immigrant sentiment. Anti-immigration and nativist movements have arisen throughout history and governments have responded to them before; but in recent decades their popular and electoral support has increased significantly. (The reemergence of such movements and the controversy surrounding immigration have prompted a number of efforts to understand the causes and consequences of contemporary immigration, including, cut not limited to, a special April 1994 issue of West European Politics, a Summer 1992 issue of International Migration Review, a July 1993 issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies, and a June 1997 issue of Social Science Quarterly, among others). Moreover, such developments are not restricted to the developed states alone. Countries on every continent have been touched and molded by the movement of people within and across borders. Newspaper stories illustrating the negative reaction that immigration arouses in host countries can be easily and regularly found in almost any major city. This has helped create the view that there is a global immigration crisis, and that immigrants present both domestic and international security threats. Whether or not this is the case is the title and main argument of Myron Weiner’s text The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights.  Weiner has produced a work that should be accessible to students and provides valuable background information for policymakers. It is part of a stream of literature that has been produced arguing, to one degree or another, that immigration is a global concern (Brubaker, 1991; Castles & Miller, 1993; Hammar, 1990; Hoskin, 1991; Meissner, 1992; Teitelbaum, 1984; and Widgren, 1990). Several of Weiner’s main points are critically important to an evaluation of global immigration and deserve closer scrutiny. First, is there truly an immigration crisis of global proportions? Second, if such a crisis exists, how does it manifest itself in countries across the globe? Third, what legal and ethical responsibilities do states have toward immigrants, particularly when the democratic demands of some groups in societies call for more immigration while other groups demand that borders be closed? This review essay seeks to evaluate the above questions in light of the evidence presented in Weiner’s study. The essay examines whether or not Weiner has demonstrated convincingly that a global immigration crisis exists, and whether or not the security issues that arise from immigration should be of concern to policymakers. A WORLD AWASH IN IMMIGRANTS? Weiner argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the level of immigration and the way immigration is viewed by policymakers over the last several decades. It is certainly true that, globally, the number of immigrants is quite high, more than 100 million, and appears to be rising. Thus, examining whether or not the growth of population movements is a sign of a global immigration crisis is the first key step in evaluating Weiner’s argument. Unfortunately, reliable, historical, global statistics on population movements are difficult or impossible to obtain. (The limitations of historical immigration data are numerous. Even European statistics, which are generally considered very reliable, reveal significant gaps and limitations. The interested reader is referred to Mitchell 1980, 1983 for an introduction to these data). Figures for the last several decades are more dependable, but still incomplete and frequently limited because there is no universally accepted definition of "immigrant." (Germany, for instance, does not include people whose ancestors were ethnically German. For a brief introduction to the definition of immigrants, consult Meissner, 1992). Furthermore, many developing countries are unable to provide comprehensive immigration statistics. For some of those that do, the figures are sporadic. Hence, the data, particularly for legal immigration, can provide us with only part of the overall picture. Contemporary refugee figures are relatively more accurate, mainly because people make claims identifying themselves as such and often make requests for assistance based on the reason they have immigrated. Furthermore, determining whether or not there is an immigration crisis that is truly global in scope is an extremely debatable and controversial proposition that will probably never be resolved to the complete satisfaction of every analyst in the field. Unfortunately, a contributing factor to this uncertainty is that the majority of the studeis in the immigration literature fall into one of two opposing camps that typically talk past one another. These often tail to evaluate whether or not there is any value in, or empirical evidence to support, the arguments of the other. Most analysts in the first, or anti-immigration camp, argue not only that a global immigration crisis exists, but that immigration can produce only negative effects (see, for example, the journal Population and Environment). In contrast, the second, or pro-immigration, camp argues that immigration is beneficial and that voluntary movement of people to "lands of opportunity" should be neither feared nor questioned. Hence, to discuss immigration in terms of crisis is unwarranted and resisted by analysts in this camp (see, for instance, Papademetriou, 1997/98 or Simon, 1989). Despite these limitations, and with a clear acknowledgement that the figures must be examined with great care, it appears that the number of people who have left their homelands has risen significantly over the last quarter century. In 1976 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported only 2.8 million refugees. By 1993, this figure had grown to nearly 19 million (Weiner 2). According to the United States Committee for Refugees (1999), from 1989 through 1997 the number of refugees and asylum seekers averaged nearly 15.8 million each year. In 1989, 15.1 million people were classified as refugees, a peak of 17.6 million was reached in 1992, and the most recent figure, for 1997, is 13.6 million. The UNHCR (1999), using a broader definition that includes internally displaced persons (those who we might label "domestic refugees"), identified nearly 50 million people who have been forced to flee their homes as of January 1, 1998. (It is also true that most immigrants and refugees come from developing countries. According to the United States Committee for Refugees in 1995, not a single advanced state is listed in the top 40 sources of refugees and asylum seekers.) Moreover, refugee and asylum figures do not include immigrant figures. The United Nations Population Fund identifies a large number of immigrants worldwide, consistently more than 100 million. Combining known immigrants with refugees and displaced persons identified by the UNHCR results in 150 million people who have left their homes. They represent about one of every 38 people on the earth, or more than 2.5 percent of the globe’s population. This is a substantial percentage of the world’s people, and one that can hardly be ignored. Furthermore, these rough figures do not include illegal immigrants; all those forced to migrate internally, whose numbers might exceed known immigration figures; and others not counted in the "official" statistics. The difficulties associated with estimating illegal immigrants are well known. Indicative of this is the disparity in figures used by different organizations and government officials. For instance, the German Ministry of the Interior claims that about 310,000 illegal immigrants entered Germany during 1992 (Der Spiegel, 1993). For the same year, Chancellor Helmut Kohl uses a figure of about 100,000, which he admits can be estimated only approximately (Kohl, 1993). These differences are not atypical of the problems that governments face when dealing with illigal immigration. (On internal immigration, see, for instance, Kulischer, 1948; Rogers, 1992; Schmeidl, 1997; and Stola, 1992). Certainly, the numbers are high, but they, alone, do not establish either that a global immigration crisis exists or that international security is threatened. One must move to an examination of the scope of the problem. Is it truly global, or are refugee and immigrant groups located mainly in specific regions? Of the known immigrants, far less than half reside in the advanced industrial states. According to the United States Committee for Refugees (1996), Europe and North America have slightly more than 16 percent of the world’s refugees, while East Asia and the Pacific have just under 3 percent. More than 36 percent of the world’s refugees reside in Africa, approximately 33 percent in the Middle East, and almost 11 percent are located in South and Central Asia. As Vernez (1991, 627) notes, approximately 90 percent of the world’s refugees are from developing states and move to other developing states. Thus, contrary to what is often popularly believed by many people in the West, more immigrants flow to the developing states than to the advanced, industrial democracies. The above observations suggest strongly that not only are the numbers of immigrants and refugees high, but that immigration is an issue that affects every area of the globe. Yet they do not necessarily show that the current levels of immigration are unprecedented. Historically, immigration has produced demonstrable patterns that can be identified. Over the last 500 years, there have been approximately six major intercontinental streams of immigrants. According to Thomlinson (1976), their probable order of magnitude mayhave been, in order: from all of Europe to Canada and the United States; from southern Europe to Latin America; from Africa to the New World, including the slave trade; from China to the rest of the world; from India to the rest of the world; and from Great Britain to Australia and Africa. A common denominator among five of these movements was immigration to the Americas. There is not doubt that it was particularly important. Between 10 and 20 million slaves were taken between 1550 and 1850 alone. It is believed that approximately 80 million Europeans immigrated to the New World. this figure is larger than the contemporary populations of many European countries, including France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Weiner, himself, points to five major waves of immigration in the modern era: the establishment of European colonial populations beginning in the seventeenth century; the slave trade and the movement of indentured servants under colonialism; the movement of major populations after the First World War and the breakup of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires; the disintegration of the colonial empires after the Second World War, which led to the creation of new states and the movement of large numbers of people; and the importation of labor that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, in large part as a response to growing needs for labor in European states. Several factors seem to have created the erroneous impression in some circles that contemporary immigration is a new crisis. From the 1920s to the 1960s, global immigration numbers were relatively modest, and were principally from Europe to European outposts or the western hemisphere. Since about 1960, however, there has been a rapid growth of movement, particularly from the developing countries. Furthermore, during the 1960s, much of the legal movement of people was controlled by governments. For instance, official labor recruitment brought many guestworkers to Europe (Castles, Booth, & Wallace, 1984; Hollifield, 1992; Kindleberger, 1967; Piore, 1979). Since the 1960s, however, many of the population movements have become increasingly independent of governmental control, resulting in possible threats to state sovereignty and creating uncertainty in the minds of many natives. Immigration has also been highlighted dramatically by the media in recent years, which has obviously become more attuned to, and capable of, reporting immigration crises, such as the movement of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. It is not surprising, then, that violence against refugees in Germany, for instance, should receive intense and sensational coverage during the early 1990s. It is also noteworthy that more recent immigration flows, particularly to the advanced industrial democracies, are not significantly larger than those attained prior to the First World War. For instance, in 1990 immigration to the United States as a percentage of the total population was 0.61 percent. This contrasts with earlier years, such as 1850 and 1910 when immigration equaled 1.34 and 1.13 percent, respectively. Similarly, immigration to Canada in 1988 equaled 0.63 percent of its population, compared to 4.59 percent in 1911. For New Zealand, the figures were 1.46 percent in 1988 and 3.88 percent in 1911 (Chapin, 1996). As Brubaker (1991) points out, "Actual international migration flows are no doubt smaller [today], in relation to global population, than they were at the height of the era of mass transatlantic migration, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (946). Thus, it is certainly not the case that contemporary immigration poses a global crisis simply because its scale is unprecedented. There are also some indications that the pressures many countries have been facing in recent years have dissipated somewhat. Refugee flows, always one of the most controversial types of immigration, appear to have declined. In Germany, for instance, Weiner correctly points out that the number of asylum seekers grew tremendously during the 1980s and early 1990s, reaching 438,000 in 1992. Yet by 1995, the figure was down to slightly more than 127,000. What this discussion reveals is that major population movements have occurred throughout human history, and the contemporary period is certainly no exception. THE "EFFECTS" OF IMMIGRATION A second key to determining whether or not Weiner is correct that there is a global immigration crisis is to look at the issues raised by immigration and the reaction of societies. The appearance of a global immigration crisis might be, as much as anything else, a function of the limited opportunities to move legally with an ever increasing demand by people for entry. Alternatively, as Baldwin-Edwards and Schain (1994) argue, "the ‘crisis of immigration’ is less a crisis of cross-border flows than it is a political crisis of elite and mass reaction to foreign-born people, only some of whom have arrived in recent years" (7). It is certainly true that native populations throughout the world look upon immigration with some concern. On the one hand, Weiner correctly argues that it is critically important to take "perceptions and fears seriously and not dismiss them as irrational, xenophobic, or paranoid" (x). This is crucial because governments that fail to address the concerns of their citizens could find that themselves losing political support, particularly in, but not limited to, democracies where the reaction of voters to immigration might be to oust the governing party (ies) if the responses of the latter are viewed as inadequate. On the other hand, assuming that an immigration crisis exists without thoroughly demonstrating the case simply feeds alarmist, and sometimes unfounded, fears. In the extreme, these manifest themselves in violence directed at immigrants. Witness, for example, the not-so-distant attacks on refugees in Germany and the more recent violence in Congo directed at Rwandan refugees, to mention just two of the more prominent cases. From the perspective of the individual immigrant, who has usually undertaken a stressful journey to reach his or her destination, there is certainly an immigration crisis, particularly when the welcome accorded an immigrant is often hostile. Sometimes, negative experiences upon arrival are part of the reason that the immigrant becomes part of a diasporic community, rather than integrating into the native population. (For an introduction to the issues that promote the creation of diasporas, consult Tölöyan 1996). Consequently, as Weiner points out, governments from London to Islamabad to Washington, D.C. have become concerned with the contemporary flow of people. His observations are by no means unsupported. For example, only 6.4 percent of governments polled in 1976 indicated that their immigration levels were too high. This percentage increased to 20.6 percent in 1989, and 31.8 percent suggested that they wanted to stop or slow down immigration (United Nations, 1989). Linked to these changing attitudes is the antiforeigner sentiment in many countries, particularly in the advanced, industrial democracies (consult Hoskin, 1991, chapter 3 for an introduction to public opinion and immigration). Betz (1994), for instance, demonstrates that antiforeigner sentiment has been growing throughout Europe, and that many states, such as Germany, Austria, and France, have experienced the growth of right-wing populist parties that aggregate anti-immigrant feelings. It also appears that the greater the cultural differences between natives and immigrants, the greater the level of fear and distrust. For instance, in France, where the anti-immigration Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen has secured a number of impressive electoral victories, a 1991 poll showed that 50 percent of all Frenchmen are "frightened" by Islam (L’Evenement Du Jeudi, 1991). Such findings are neither atypical nor restricted to the developed world, as Weiner points out, "The bhoomiputras in Malaysia regarded the influx of Chinese and others from Vietnam as so threatening as to lead the Malaysian government to reject Vietnamese boats carrying refugees even when vessels were in danger of sinking. Similarly the Assamese rejected the influx of Bengalis, Indian-born Nepalis, and Marwaris from other parts of India" (141). In Fiji, the native Fijians overthrew a democratically-elected government that was dominated by Indians. Nepal has resisted immigration from Northern India, fearing that it will erode Nepali cultural hegemony. Not surprisingly, questions regarding what it means to be a citizen (Bauböck, 1991; Hammar, 1990) have also been raised in many countries, resulting in further political debate and controversy about whether or not immigration is desirable, and what efforts, if any, should be made to integrate non-citizens into native society. Furthermore, as Weiner points out, "state policies toward emigration and immigration are often shaped by concerns over internal stability and international security" (132). These possible threats can take many forms, although, as Weiner indicates, "what constitutes a threat is a matter of perception" (135). For instance, one society might value cultural homogeneity more than another; one ethnic group might welcome new immigrants more than another; and businesses might take radically different views of immigration than labor unions. Moreover, the volume and type of immigration clearly influences natives’ reaction, as do prevailing economic conditions. France, for instance, was undoubtedly more willing to accept guestworkers in the booming 1960s than in the high-unemployment 1990s. Global economic conditions since the early 1970s have changed dramatically. Before then, there seemed to be a general consensus among policymakers that the free movement of people added to economic growth, and Europe’s economic recovery after the Second World War was fueled in large part by the labor of immigrants. However, following the 1973 Oil Shock and the economic dislocation that accompanied it, many countries, particularly the advanced industrial states, required far fewer immigrant laborers than was previously the case. (Immigrant labor has been important in other areas of the world. For instance, several million immigrant laborers are employed in the Middle East.) When immigrant workers were laid off, some utilized unemployment and other welfare programs that they were entitled to, and these actions raised fears that immigrants were becoming burdens on society. One of the arguments used originally to justify the use of immigrant laborers was that they contributed towards welfare programs, but did not utilize them, at least not as much as natives. Thus, it was thought, the presence of immigrant workers was a net gain to societies (see, for instance, Herbert, 1990). When immigrants began to use welfare resources more extensively, they were not wanted, particularly by native workers who felt their jobs were threatened and by politicians who believed that a failure to restrict immigration would result in electoral defeat. Most European states, for instance, quickly halted their recruitment of foreign labor, and many tried, with varying degrees of usually limited success, to repatriate their guestworkers. Most legal avenues of immigration were severely curtailed, and throughout the developed world, socioeconomic problems remain concerns to this day. These include unemployment, the future of the welfare state and whether or not immigrants should be allowed to participate in it, and crime rates, to mention the most prominent issues. These are precisely the issues that antiforeigner groups have seized upon to argue for further immigration restrictions. There are a number of reasons that these sentiments are so strong. First, however, it should be noted that the same opinions arose with previous waves of immigration. Seldom have large population movements been greeted with unreserved approval by every native. As Rose (1991) remarks about the United States, "While it is true that the first hundred years of nationhood were marked by the relatively open entry of hundreds of thousands, there were always concerns about those who were seen as particularly unassimilable" (180). Nevertheless, the guestworker experience in Europe after the Second World War indicates that immigration can occur with a minimum of hostility, at least when economic growth and prosperity are occurring. Unfortunately, problems often result whenever increases in immigration coincide with increases in socioeconomic problems. What appears to occur is that some natives react with a mixture of xenophobia and simple fear, and these feelings are strongest during economic downturns, particularly when unemployment levels are high or increasing. Other socioeconomic problems, such as rising crime rates or increasing expenditures on welfare, are also often accompanied by antiforeigner sentiment. While the inflow of immigrants and increases in socioeconomic problems occurring simultaneously is not enough to necessarily establish a causal link between the two, a consequence is that it makes it easier for some groups in society to blame the problems on immigrants, and domestic political conflict usually ensues. It might not matter to unemployed voters whether or not immigrants, alone, are actually creating their unemployment. If enough of them believe that immigrants are the "cause" of their problems, it can result in voter support for anti-immigration parties and restrictive immigration legislation on the part of politicians who fear electoral backlashes if they fail to act. A ramification of this might be that xenophobia could become legitimized by basing anti-foreigner sentiment on false claims. Questions regarding whether or not a causal relationship exists between immigration and socioeconomic problems, which do confront governments with real dilemmas, are difficult to answer, and Weiner devotes only a few pages to this discussion in Chapter 6. This is possibly a result of disciplinary specialization, although Weiner has made efforts to overcome this limitation. All too often, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and other specialists fail to integrate adequately their separate literatures. His limited discussion here is unfortunate, because many of the domestic security concerns regarding immigration results from these fears. Whether or not they are legitimate is not as important as the impact they have on the political agendas of many countries. This is not solely attributable to natives’ mixed views regarding the socioeconomic effects of immigration. The scientific community has also been unable to reach any sort of consensus regarding the effects of immigration. Three areas seem particularly important: wages and unemployment, crime, and welfare payments, the three problems most often blamed on immigrants by antiforeigner groups. Each of these issues is fundamental to understanding why a global immigration crisis might exist. Yet, the empirical studies that have been conducted to date reflect far too clearly the ideological divisions that exist between analysts in this field. For instance, there are a number of studies that examine the effect of immigration on native employment rates (Altonji & Card, 1989; Borjas, 1990; Foster & Withers, 1993; Grossman, 1982; Huddle, 1994; Simon, 1989). At one extreme is Simon (1989, 1996), who argues vociferously that immigrants increase the wealth and welfare of host countries under any and all circumstances. At the other extreme are the studies by analysts, such as Huddle (1994), Huddle, Corwin, and MacDonald (1985), that show repeatedly that immigrants undermine native wages and employment opportunities. There appears to be no middle ground and much of their research seems to be driven by ideological considerations. This is a problem that arises in far too many of the studies that examine the other socioeconomic effects of immigration, as well. Furthermore, the direct costs of recent immigration, particularly for refugees and asylum seekers has created anxiety for some native groups. As Vernez (1991) points out, it is clearly more expensive to repatriate or resettle refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in the short run, than it is to provide care and assistance (629). The additional cost for the former approach can be up to 100 times greater than the latter (for an introduction to these issues, consult Stein, 1986). In either case, dealing with refugees and asylum seekers requires financial resources that can become politically controversial, particularly when combined with the fears of natives, whether real or imagined, that immigrants are causing socioeconomic problems in societies. In addition to these domestic interests, contemporary immigration raises a host of international and foreign policy issues. Weiner argues that refugees and immigrants are threats to domestic and international security. Whenever a country classifies immigrants as refugees fleeing political persecution, it is likely to create an international conflict with the state from where the refugees originated. This problem is especially evident when refugees use the host country to influence the domestic affairs of their country of origin. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the effort of the United States to arm Cubans to overthrow the Castro regime during the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. Other, more recent examples abound as well: contra exiles from Nicaragua being armed by the United States to fight the Nicaraguan government, Bangladeshis being armed by India to fight the Pakistani military, Afghani refugees being armed to fight Soviet troops, and Palestinian refugees receiving support from Arab states to fight Israel (Weiner, 1995 137-38). These developments were clearly influenced by other international and security considerations, such as the Cold War environment that dominated American thinking leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Yet, the presence of immigrants who lobby the host government to support their cause (and are sometimes used as foreign policy "tools" by the host government) is often a prerequisite for such activities. This is not all. On occasion, the immigration of large numbers of people has resulted in the adoption of coercive methods by governments to halt the flows, including interstate war. For instance, in 1971 approximately 10 million East Pakistani refugees immigrated to India, which regarded this movement as an effort by Pakistan to resolve internal political problems by exporting them. The response of the Indian government was to send troops into Pakistan. The violence between Israelis and Palestinians is well documented, and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq is yet another instance whereby force was used to deal with undesired refugee movements. Turkey has responded to the violence in Iraq by sealing its borders to the immigration of Kurds. In Europe, the violence surrounding the Muslims in Bosnia resulted in the dislocation of several hundred thousand people. The intervention of NATO troops as peacekeepers has helped to stop, at least temporarily, the violence between the Muslims and Serbs, and this action does not seem to have had any deterrent effect on Serbia in its actions vis-à-vis Kosovo. NATO airstrikes against Serbia, beginning in March, 1999, were launched, at least in part, as an effort to stop the persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and, thus, eliminate the main reason many of them were emigrating. Unfortunately, instead of halting the emigration, the reverse situation occurred. As a result of the NATO attacks, the Serbians increased their pressure on the ethnic Albanians and within days, tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians were streaming to the borders. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1999a) nearly 200,000 people had been displaced from Kosovo as a result of internal violence from 1 March, 1998 through 24 March, 1999. This number quickly swelled to more than 500,000, and peaked at approximately one million people. It is certainly true that those people caught in the fighting in former Yugoslavia (and people in the neighboring countries) would argue that a crisis-situation exists, and one could make a case that, given the large number of countries who have become involved militarily, diplomatically, or through relief efforts, this particular "immigrant" problem has become global in scope. American foreign policy has also been affected significantly by the immigration of refugees from Haiti, most of whom were seeking to escape political persecution and economic poverty. The movement of these relatively poor and uneducated refugees into the United States seemed to create fears that violence between natives and the refugees would occur and that a possible voter backlash might result if the government failed to take forceful action. Other considerations included the demands of local governments, especially in southeastern states, such as Florida, that the national government relieve them of much of the burden the refugees would create. There were also fears that many Haitian refugees were infected with HIV. The result was a threat by President Bill Clinton to launch an American invasion of Haiti, something that was prevented only at the last minute by the diplomatic intervention of a team of negotiators led by former President Jimmy Carter. Furthermore, as Teitelbaum (1984) points out, policy decisions can induce large population movements. This occurred with the recruitment of guestworkers by Middle East and European states, particularly in the 1960s. It has also occurred regularly throughout the world, including the Asian "boat people" crisis of the late 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that resulted in up to four million refugees fleeing to Pakistan and Iran, and the recent decision of the German government to repatriate the former Yugoslavian refugees to their homelands. Changing international conditions have prompted massive movements as well. The most notable is the end of the Cold War, which has created opportunities for several million people in the former communist world to move to the West. These movements averaged no more than 100,000 during most of the 1980s, but reached 1.2 million in 1989 (Widgren, 1990), and have remained high since then. Ethnic Germans moving from East Europe to Germany, alone, averaged more than 250,000 each year for the first half of the 1990s. It is likely that changes in other regimes would prompt massive emigration as well. If North Korea, which has been suffering from famines and massive starvation, for instance, were to relax its border controls, it is likely that many, perhaps several million, would emigrate. In addition, Weiner argues that immigrants sometimes become opponents of their original home countries, as occurred with Iranians living in France during the 1970s and Kurds from Turkey living in Germany today. The Kurds in Turkey have been fighting for an independent homeland for years, and violence between the two groups in Germany has been a regular occurrence during the 1990s (see, for instance, Chapin, 1997, chapter six). Such developments can lead to internal conflict and violence, and lead to foreign policy difficulties, or worse. Immigrants are also sometimes viewed as threats to the host country’s indigenous culture and as economic and social burdens. According to Weiner, the inevitable conflict between politicians’ duty to protect the interests of their citizens and the obligation we all have towards the well-being of humankind can lead to more problems, both domestic and international in nature. Are instances such as these enough to conclude that a global immigration crisis exists? It might be more accurate to label many of them as regional crises, at least in the sense that they affect largely only one or several countries. However, these crises also take on a global dimension for several reasons. First, they are atavistic. Although, for instance, refugee flows seem to have declined slightly from the high levels of the early 1990s, it is unlikely that they will disappear, or that they will not return again to their previous levels or grow larger. Second, most of the world’s population growth over the next generation will occur in the developing world, at least 95 percent (Widgren, 1990 758). As long as economic conditions there remain relatively less attractive than in the developed world, immigration pressures should be expected to continue. There is also no reason to believe that the political reasons that people move will completely and permanently disappear, particularly as long as regimes exist that continue to persecute people based upon their ethnic characteristics or political beliefs. Third, there are still many immigrant groups attempting to influence their homelands from host countries: Cubans in America, Chinese lobbying to effect change in the People’s Republic, Turks and Kurds in Germany, and Algerians in France, to mention just a few of the more prominent cases. Weiner’s main argument, that there is a global immigration crisis, seems to have some merit, although it must be stressed that the magnitude of the problem is debatable and the international community’s efforts to provide ad hoc and provisional solutions to immigration problems seems to be working, at least in the short term. While there are certainly reasons to question whether or not specific problems are real, such as the socioeconomic problems blamed on immigrants, the political controversies and problems that result from such claims are genuine. The international and foreign policy effects of population movements have also been profound. These might not influence every state equally, but there do appear to be recurrent crises that the global community should not, and cannot ignore, particularly in a world that is increasingly characterized by the media and academic community as global in nature. At the very least, as Weiner argues, substantive questions arise because policymakers at the state level must balance the need to meet the demands of their citizens with the economic, political, and humanitarian obligations people have towards the global community. MEETING THE CRISIS Weiner maintains that the global immigration crisis should not, and cannot, be ignored, specifically because it presents serious challenges to states and the preservation of human rights. He presents three possible options: accommodation, control, or intervention. Accommodation involves expanding the level of legal immigration and quietly accepting illegal immigration (202). This option makes sense, according to Weiner, from the perspective of neoclassical economics, which argues that economic benefits derive from the free movement of the factors of production. Furthermore, Weiner explores whether or not traditional state sovereignty, as it has been commonly understood, has become increasingly "anachronistic." Given the scope of global immigration, along with the social, economic, and political controversies that result, he concludes that there is no reason to surrender control over state borders. Weiner’s second option, greater border control, involves increasing the involvement of the military and police to patrol borders, increasing the penalties for those assisting or hiring illegal immigrants, and repatriating those whose requests for asylum have been denied, among other things. He also discusses the use of internal controls, such as tamper-proof identity cards, but acknowledges the difficulties and opposition that these would incur. The use of border controls is by no means new or unused. For instance, Japan erected and retained clear barriers to immigrants as part of a policy decision reached after the Second World War to retain cultural homogeneity. There are no indications that major changes in this policy are imminent. Germany has moved to limit the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers, and legal immigration has been made very difficult to obtain. Weiner concludes that both the developed and developing world will turn more towards these methods as immigration pressures increase. The third option, intervention, involves changing the economic, political, and social factors in sending countries that prompted the emigration in the first place. Such efforts have become more common in recent years. Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti, are just three of the more prominent examples. Economic assistance, coercive diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention are possible tools that Weiner identifies. Economic intervention, for instance, has occurred with the Caribbean Basin Initiative of the United States, and was one of the key arguments used to garner support for the North American Free Trade Agreement. The logic is simple. Efforts to improve the economic conditions of people in poorer countries will reduce the incentives they possess to emigrate. Most economists agree with the argument, at least in the long term. However, empirical evidence suggests that, in the short-term, emigration pressures increase as people formerly too poor to emigrate acquire the financial means necessary to do so (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986; Davis, 1989). Weiner points out that economic growth is not historically associated with decreases in emigration. For instance, hundreds of thousands of Germans emigrated at the end of the 19th century even though the country was experiencing massive economic growth. Countries that have sent the most guestworkers to Europe and laborers to the United States were among the strongest developing states: Turkey and Mexico, for instance. In part, this occurs because immigrants acquire the means to emigrate. It also results from immigrant networks that arise and provide the information and opportunities necessary for more people to leave their homelands. However, the practical application of interventionist policies is limited primarily to the rich states, because the poor states do not possess the means to implement such strategies. The advanced, industrial democracies that possess the necessary economic, military, and political capabilities would undoubtedly be viewed as imperialistic by many poor countries if they intervene, and other states, such as the People’s Republic of China, would also be viewed with suspicion. Thus, intervention is an approach replete with obvious perils. Ultimately, Weiner concludes, some states will move towards more intervention and others will restrict entry. Neither, he contends, is necessarily immoral. Instead, he posits several moral guidelines that should be followed. If states choose to limit immigration, they should do so in nondiscriminatory fashion and those who are allowed to immigrate should eventually receive the option of becoming citizens. The cultural practices of immigrants should be protected, and international standards to protect guestworkers should be created. Furthermore, the right to asylum should be retained, no single country should bear the cost of caring for persecuted people, and repatriation of asylum seekers should remain the primary objective of asylum policy. Finally, intervention should occur when morally justified, such as to stop genocidal behavior. While Weiner makes a number of valuable insights, his recommendations, particularly in regard to his moral guidelines about military intervention, are limited. He argues that military intervention is necessary whenever a threshold of violence is reached. As he acknowledges, however, "There are no clear rules to tell us what this threshold is" (221). If, as he says, intervention should occur only when it does "more good than harm" and when sufficient public support is obtained, it is likely that many cases of persecution will continue, even when morally reprehensible. The same difficulties that have made collective security largely ineffective, such as reaching agreement on who the "aggressor" is, and implementing sanctions in the face of high domestic costs, to mention just two of the more important ones, could be expected with the adoption of an interventionist policy (see Downs, 1994 and Weiss, 1993 for discussions regarding the promise and problems of collective security). Simply determining who should decide whether more good than harm is to be expected and with what criteria are difficult tasks. Any government making such decisions is likely to be influenced by other foreign-policy considerations. Efforts could be made to shift the responsibility to an international forum, such as the United Nations Security Council. However, it is probable that the Security Council would have even more difficulty than individual states, and reaching decisions about when intervention should occur would be difficult at best, particularly when the five permanent members can unilaterally veto any action. For example, one could argue persuasively that NATO carried out the effort to protect Albanians in Kosovo by bombing Serbia because agreement in the Security Council was unlikely to be achieved. Thus, overall, Weiner provides good general descriptions of the tools (sanctions, aid, coercive diplomacy, and military intervention) that states can use, and discusses many of the critical moral issues that should be addressed if an interventionist policy is adopted. Furthermore, most analysts will agree with Weiner’s argument that greater international cooperation and more multilateral efforts to address global immigration issues are needed. However, his work would be greatly strengthened if he could provide substantive recommendations about how to overcome the political obstacles currently limiting progress in these critical areas. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION As noted previously, Weiner’s work fits into a larger stream of literature that argues to one degree or another, that there is a global immigration crisis. His thesis appears to have some merit, and there is evidence that seems to demonstrate that a crisis exists. The main challenges are to determine its magnitude and consequences, and to identify solutions. We know that more than 2.5 percent of the world’s population consists of immigrants and refugees. Their movement has been alternatively beneficial and controversial for the receiving states, and possibly for both the immigrants, themselves, and the sending states as well. However, the scope of contemporary immigration is not unprecedented and, contrary to popular perception, immigration is just as much, if not more, of a problem for the developing world as it is for the advanced industrial countries. Furthermore, it does not appear that immigration affects every area of the globe equally. Some problems, such as the inflow of asylum seekers, are more evident in countries like Germany than elsewhere. What does appear to be relatively more uniform is the political controversy that often accompanies immigration, particularly during economic downturns characterized by phenomena such as high unemployment. Whether or not immigration causes, for instance, unemployment is not as important as the fact that many natives believe in a causal relationship, and this leads to political controversies and crises. It also seems likely that even though persecution-induced emigration and state intervention occur mainly at the regional level, it can only be addressed adequately at the global level, and through multi-lateral efforts. It is likely that the numbers of those who leave their homelands will continue to rise, as long as the economic inequalities, and political and social problems remain that compel people to leave remain. To continue to deal with immigration issues without long-term plans runs the risk of allowing immigration problems to become unmanageable. Ultimately, there are simply too many pressures on people to emigrate to expect that the phenomenon will disappear on its own accord, and there are certainly times when immigration is desirable. In the long term, it is likely that a more interventionist policy framework will have to be adopted if the domestic and international concerns that arise from immigration are to be addressed in a way that will protect the interests of both the immigrants, and the communities they leave and join. However, if such policies are adopted by individual state governments, particularly those in the West, the policies are likely to be viewed by many countries as efforts to maintain western dominance, including neo-colonialism. Thus, it is imperative for the international community to adopt a more proactive and cooperative position and to identify practical ways to overcome the political impediments to such cooperation. Future immigration research should be directed along these lines. Wesley Chapin is an assistant professor of political science and director of the international studies minor at the University of Wisconsin River Falls. He authored The Political Effects of International Migration in 1997 (Greenwood Press). © Wesley D. Chapin
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