Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict BOOK REVIEWS
	Fall out: An Historian Reflects on America's Encounter with Nuclear Weapons by Paul Boyer Ohio University Press, 1998. Although the American public's interest in nuclear weapons has fluctuated wildly since their shocking debut in 1945, the nuclear issue has deeply permeated American life. This is reflected not only in U.S. diplomacy and national security policy, but -- as Paul Boyer's new book, Fallout, reminds us -- in American society and culture. Indeed, surveying the American response to nuclear weapons through the mid-1990s, Boyer concludes that "without close attention to this larger impact of the nuclear reality, large swaths of American thought and culture in the years after 1945 become opaque and incomprehensible" (pp. xiii-xiv). Fallout is a collection of sixteen essays by Boyer -- one written in collaboration with a student of his, Eric Idsvoog -- on America's interaction with the Bomb. Originally appearing in professional journals, opinion magazines, major newspapers, and scholarly books, they vary widely in character, ranging from scholarly articles to journalism to op-ed columns to book reviews. Ordinarily, a collection of such disparate materials, produced at different times for different kinds of publications, would suffer from some degree of incoherence. But Boyer's writing is so lucid, gripping, and thought-provoking that the reader is quickly swept up in the issues, with little sense that the book might have been written in some other way. The essays focus on items of considerable significance. They include America's initial response to the atomic bombing of Japan, President Harry Truman's painful struggle with the nuclear issue as he began to comprehend its full ramifications, the reaction of diplomats and strategists to the Bomb, the curious role of the American medical profession in the nuclear arena, the eerie prescience of Stanley Kubrick's film Dr. Strangelove, the decline of the nuclear disarmament movement, President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the limited nuclear knowledge of post-Cold War college students, the persistence of nuclear themes in American culture, and the bitter, unsettled controversy among Americans over the necessity of the Hiroshima bombing. These essays are enlivened by a sprightly narrative, replete with colorful, illuminating, and sometimes startling evidence. Boyer has an eye for the bizarre -- a feature that he shows us was not confined to marginal groups but, rather, was common enough at the centers of power. For example, Boyer outlines some remarkable ventures initiated in the late 1950s by Edward Teller, the director of the U.S. government's Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratories. Often referred to as "the father of the H-Bomb," Teller began to champion what he called "geographical engineering," a grotesque operation to be conducted by exploding hydrogen bombs. As he joked at one news conference: "If your mountain is not in the right place, drop us a postcard" (p. 89). One project of this type that particularly intrigued him was rearranging the Panama Canal by blasting through it with nuclear weapons. Launching a preliminary foray, he lined up the support of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for Project Chariot, a venture that entailed detonating up to six thermonuclear bombs at a site he selected on Alaska's coast. The resulting crater, he claimed, would become a major international harbor and, thus, stimulate fabulous economic development in the region. Boyer maintains that the major reason for the project was to make such "peaceful" use of atomic energy so appealing that they would be exempted from a future nuclear test ban agreement, thereby providing a cover for secret nuclear weapons research. A subordinate reason was to study the effects of nuclear radiation on the tundra's ecosystem, presumably including its human population. Eventually, resistance to Project Chariot by Alaskan Eskimos (who were less eager than AEC officials to see their environment turned into a radioactive wasteland), environmental groups, and the Kennedy administration led to its demise. Even so, scientists working for the AEC did manage to transport highly radioactive sand to Alaska from the U.S. government's nuclear test site in Nevada to see what would happen to it when it washed into local aquifers, streams, and ponds. Then, with their experiment at an end, they gathered 15,000 pounds of the contaminated soil into a mound, bulldozed other soil over it, and departed, without posting warnings of even telling local officials what they had done. Boyer also spotlights the bizarre role of Bible-prophecy popularizers. In the eyes of these Christian fundamentalists, nuclear war was nothing more than God's final judgment upon a sinful world. As such, it was clearly to be expected, perhaps even welcomed. Through their writings, sermons, and television programs, they reached enormous audiences with the news of divine plans for vast slaughter and suffering. In evangelist Hal Lindsey Jr.'s The Late Great Planet Earth (which outsold all other nonfiction books in the 1970s), readers were treated to a "quadrillion megaton explosion," civilian casualties in the billions, and (as the water obligingly turned to blood) mass poisoning. "There's going to be a big rush on Coca-Cola," Lindsey explained, "but even this will give out after a while" (p. 140). "The Tribulation will result in such bloodshed and destruction that any war up to that time will seem insignificant," the Rev. Jerry Falwell assured his "Old Time Gospel Hour" audience. "God only knows how many human beings will be wiped out in that battle," he later asserted, "but they will be wiped out" (p. 147). Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network, argued that Israel's capture of Jerusalem's Old City had set the stage for nuclear Armageddon, and he confidently predicted the ultimate holocaust by 1982. Growing ever more excited with the beginning of that auspicious year, Robertson opined that the world would be "in flames" by its end. In May, he broadcast: "I guarantee you by the fall of 1982 there is going to be a judgment on the world" (p. 148). The faithful, of course, would escape unscathed. "If you are saved," Falwell assured his listeners, "you will never go through one hour, not one moment of the Tribulation" (p. 147). Indeed, the righteous (and certainly their leaders) could now sit back and enjoy things. As the fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntire put it: "Thank God, I will get a view of the Battle of Armageddon from the grandstand seats of the heavens" (p. 146). Bible prophecy, Boyer shows us, made its advent in Washington with the advent of the "Reagan revolution." Deeply affected by prophecy-believers -- including Lindsey and Falwell, the latter of whom served as his White House confidant -- Reagan told a lobbyist for Israel in 1983: "You know, I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find myself wondering if we're the generation that's going to see that come about. I don't know if you've noted any of these prophecies lately, but believe me, they certainly describe the times we're going through." Queried about the subject during the televised 1984 Presidential debates, Reagan remarked that he had a "philosophical" interest in Armageddon and that "a number of theologians" thought "the prophecies are coming together and portend that" (pp. 152-53). Several other administration officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Interior, made similar statements. Meanwhile, Robertson organized the Christian Coalition, which became a leading force in the Republican Party. If this kind of thing may strike readers as rather chilling, it should be kept in mind that Fallout also examines more thoughtful attempts to grapple with the issues of the nuclear era. There are extensive descriptions of efforts by atomic scientists, medical practitioners, intellectuals, and other citizen activists to foster nuclear arms controls and disarmament. Boyer shows that these and other attempts to cool enthusiasm for nuclear war sometimes met with ferocious opposition -- as, for example, when historians brought forth evidence that raised questions about the necessity for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Here, he notes, they challenged the "national mythology of innocence and exceptionalism" (p. 15) and, thereby, stirred up a hornet's nest of superpatriotism. But he also indicates that some of the nuclear warriors began to adjust their vision to a world in which nuclear war had become morally odious, politically unacceptable, and militarily suicidal. Harry Truman moved toward a more realistic appraisal of the nuclear menace, Edward Teller was forced to live without Project Chariot and with the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson began to suggest that nuclear war might not be inevitable, and Ronald Reagan made his peace with the Russians and signed agreements for nuclear disarmament. Fallout, then, provides important insights into America's cultural, social, and psychological response to nuclear weapons. It is the thoughtful, carefully-crafted work of a master historian, attuned to the moral, cultural, and political dilemmas that have haunted the nuclear age. Reviewed by: Lawrence S. Wittner State University of New York Albany, New York Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts by Timothy Sisk, Washington, D.C. United States Institute of Peace, 1996. In Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Timothy Sisk observes that the process of post-settlement peacebuilding in deeply divided societies is especially precarious in the transitional period between the negotiated settlement and the establishment of sustainable democratic institutions. The continuation of inter-ethnic enmities, fueled by mutual mistrust, suspicion, and the resulting fears of further hostilities, seriously threatens the political power-sharing which are the foundations of post-war reconciliation, reconstruction, and institution-building. Sisk then concludes that the long-term success of the post-settlement peacebuilding process depends upon two inter-related conditions. First, a sense of moderation, encouraged by an awareness of a common destiny and a commitment to pragmatic coexistence, must be deeply embedded in the society as a whole. Second, a core of moderate elites, who aggressively pursue inter-ethnic reconciliation through active mediation, just emerge to represent a broad range of constituencies and interests throughout the entire polity. Nonetheless, this comprehensive review of recent mediation scholarship is silent concerning the process or sequence of events by which moderation and moderate elites eventually emerge in deeply divided societies. Initially, Sisk suggests two possible directions for future research. Unfortunately, neither direction, by itself, appears completely adequate. The first concentrates on elites as the primary variable determining the broadening of moderation. This top-down approach was initially suggested by Eric Nordlinger who observed that elites will recognize the political benefits of moderation and then persuade their respective ethnic communities to abandon zero-sum competition in favor of mutually beneficial reconciliation and mediation. (Conflict Regulation in Dvidied Societies. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972.) Sisk corectly points out that in many cases negotiated settlements have failed to create strong structural incentives for moderation. Consequently, elite motives for pursuing moderation remain unclear. In other words, "Why do elites moderate, and to what end?" (83) Sisk points out an alternative direction starting with the "relationship between elite attitudes and mass or popular beliefs" (82). This bottom-up approach focuses on the demands for moderation emerging from the society itself. Elites then respond in kind. As Sisk observes, the elite-mass dichotomy is overly simplistic. His own research on South Africa Elusive Social Contract. Princeton, NJ: (Democratization in South Africa: The Princeton University Press, 1995) as well as other scholarship on Northern Ireland (Gavin Duffy and Natalie Frensley. "Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and Demobilization in Northern Ireland." Program on Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Working Paper 13, 1989) reveals that local and regional elites whose political survival depends upon the continuation of inter-ethnic conflict can effectively withstand societal demands for moderation. This is especially true in societies where elites at every level control much of association life by imposing strict, ethnically based requirements for organizational membership. Although these insights suggest that moderation must emerge at various levels of society, an obvious question remains: Why do societies as a whole moderate, and to what end? A more useful approach to this question has been suggested by those scholars who over the last decade have examined examples of the transition from non-democratic to democratic governance in the developing world. (For example, see Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991; and, G. Schmitz and David Giles, The Challenge of Democratic Development: Sustaining Democratization in Developing Countries, Ottawa, ON: The North-South Institute, 1992.) Their findings imply that the long-term success of post-settlement peacebuilding requires the simultaneous emergence of moderation from below and moderate elites from above. And this occurs when both the society at large and a broad range of elites are bound together by a commonly held political culture, reflecting shared democratic values and practices. Many of the analytical frameworks developed by these scholars employ the concept of civil society. Although this concerpt encompasses a wide range of definitions, there is general agreement that it refers to the social sphere where individuals and groups engage in activiities of public consequence through the formation and maintenance of voluntary assoications and informal networks. (Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992; John Dunn, ed., Democracy, London: Oxford University Press, 1992; and, John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso, 1988) Three sets of elements in civil society are especially useful for this research project. First, its structural elements highlight the vital function non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can perform by preventing the state from monopolizing power and consequently undermining the poltical authonomy of individuals and groups. (Saad Ibin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World, in Civil Society in the Middle East (volume 1), Augustus Richard Norton, ed, New York: E.J. Brill: 38, 1995). In other words, civil society can sustain democratic institutions by permitting non-state elites and the constituencies they represent to pursue their common interests through NGOs from undue interference by the state. Civil society is more than a melange of voluntary associations and informal networks. It consists of normative values and practices necessary for preventing the melange from collapsing into a zero-sum conflict between feuding factions and cliques. This second set of elements stresses the critical role of tolerance in reconciling class, ideological and ethnic differences and the resulting disparity in political views and social attitudes. It also includes an active commitment to the peaceful mediation of such differences by every NGO. As Augustus Richard Norton has observed, democratic institutions are sustained as much by the commitment to reconciliation and mediation within and between NGOs as they are by the commitment to reconciliation and mediation between NGOs and the state. (Interview at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, April 15, 1996) Finally, the concept of civil society identifies the specific voluntary associations and informal networks responsible for deepening moderation and broadening the core of moderate elites. According to Norton, human rights groups, religious organizations, associations of artists and writers as well as professional groups of lawyers, doctors, or engineers tend to be the source of moderate elites. Civil society also prescribes the practices these groups can employ in support of moderation: reconciliation and mediation activities founded upon an awareness of a shared destiny and pragmatic, collaborative problem solving. The linkage between civil society and the long-term success of the post-settlement peacebuiling process is clear. Sustainable democratic institutions depend upon the convergence of moderation from below and moderate elites from above. Civil society provides the foundations (values, practices, and organizations) and time necessary for this process to occur simultaneously. This is particularly crucial for deeply divided societies where elites and/or external mediators have imposed novel democratic power-sharing structures through negotiated settlements. Such structures can not overcome lingering ethnic enmities unless each community in the society pragmatically embraces reconciliation and mediation as the twin foundations for their stable, long-term coexistence. Reviewed by: Garth Katner St. Norbert College De Pere, Wisconsin. The City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem by Meron Benvenisti, Berkeley University of California Press, 1996. The recent slow and tortured death of the Oslo Accords makes it difficult to disagree with the negative assessment of the future status of Jerusalem offered by Meron Benvenisti. In his latest book, The City of Stone, he observes that the Israeli government will continue to administer a unified city with aggressive policies that keep the other religious and national communities, particularly the Palestinians, from full political participation. If this were not disturbing enough, Benvenisti concludes that such a status quo will eventually be shattered when the continuing struggle between Israelis and Palestinians turns violent. The only optimistic alternative he considers, rather unenthusiastically, is that "the old dialogue of action and reaction, nonverbal but occasionally violent" will remain until both Israelis and Palestinians conclude "that the time has come to replace it with a political dialogue aimed at reading an agreed-upon political settlement." (131) BenvenistiÕs conclusions are not surprising, particularly to those familiar with both his life and scholarship. Whether he is judged as a pessimistic cynic or a blunt realist does not really matter. Since its founding some 3000 years ago, Jerusalem has been endowed with strife as much as holiness. Although Benvenisti does not offer any new insights, he does offer us unique observations from the perspective of an insider. In fact, he offers a historical tour of the city not unlike that given by those friendly, older Arab gentlemen who used to frequent the cafes of the Old City in pursuit of companionship. Anyone who has encountered these gentlemen will remember being offered a special tour in which the otherwise hidden sights of the city are revealed to be very worthwhile indeed. Benvenisti himself reveals a number of unnoticed but significant sights in and around the city. On his tour they become illustrations of several enduring truths about the Israeli-Palestinian struggle for Jerusalem: past, present and future. The first and most obvious truth is that "the history of the boundaries of Jerusalem has been a history of the conflicts over it." (54) Over the last 100 years, the growth of the city beyond the old walls of its original boundaries has altered demographic reality for Jews and Palestinians alike. In other words, the expansion of Jewish neighborhoods into Arab villages just outside the existing municipal boundaries inevitably exacerbates the tensions between the two communities. As a result, Jerusalem has become a city divided into ethnic enclaves where every resident has "a tribal map stored in their heads, and know which areas are safe and which are dangerous." (198) Like many municipal governments responsible for historic cities, the Jerusalem municipality must constantly chose between the competing values of preservation and development. However, according to Benvenisti, the process is especially acrimonious in Jerusalem because both values have been invoked to promote national goals of both Jews and Palestinians. He therefore dedicates considerable space in The City of Stone to discussing the implications of 30 years of Israeli municipal development for the Palestinain community in Jerusalem. When housing and infrastructure projects exclusively benefit the community that controls the city the call for preservation becomes a desperate tactic of the dispossessed. In the end, concludes, Benvenisti, the fate of the city will be determined more by a plannerÕs red pencil than by any military engagement. This is not to say that the Jews and Palestinians have not learned how to live with one another in Jerusalem. A dialog of actions has evolved between the two communities in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution. Benvenisti warns, however, that such a dialog should not be viewed as a blueprint for an eventual peace. It is instead a means by which Jews and Palestinians can live their lives virtually separate from one another while managing their relationship with as little friction as possible. This has subsequently produced "two normal societiesÉ(which) have a very abnormal set of mutual relations." (176) On the one hand, ethnic polarization remains high since each community continues to perceive the other as a threat. On the other, Palestinian frustration and alienation has necessarily intensified as they have seen their political or socioeconomic status lag behind that of the Jewish community. More often than not, both communities abide by these rules of disengagement although neither supports that administrative division of Jerusalem as an acceptable solution. Any solution must necessarily accommodate the interests of the two communities within the structure of a single, integrated municipal government. Benvenisti points out that this basic requirement for peace has not changed fundamentally for nearly 100 years. Therefore, despite the great diversity of municipal plans, they all share a certain family resemblance. Essentially, they propose a centralized city council with seats allocated by ethnic quotas, a centralized council with no quotas but limited autonomy for local ethnic neighborhoods, or a decentralized ethnic borough system, or a trusteeship by a national government or international governmental organization. The failure of all of these plans to gain the mutual support of Jews and Palestinians cannot be blamed upon their specific details. Instead Benvenisti suggests three broader explanations why a just and lasting solution is a virtual mission impossible. First, the problem of Jerusalem is irrational at its core. The emotional attachments of each community to this city run very deep beneath and more manageable political and economic issues. Second, would-be peacemakers and other well-intentioned professionals, particularly outsiders, do not seem to realize the necessity for constant mediation over specific goals. Without the long-term commitment to a true process of details, peace can (and has in the case of the Oslo Accords) be stalled on either side by those who oppose any stage of the process. Finally, Benvenisti asks a simple yet devastating question: "If Arabs and Jews cannot coexist in one country how can they be expected to coexist in one city?" (212) The problem of Jerusalem is more than 100 years old now. Although the physical character of the city has changed radically, the relationship between those who would hope to direct such change remains essentially the same. Memories are long but wisdom is short. In the final chapter, "Seashells on the Jerusalem Shore," Benvenisti seems, at first, to envy the dead of this eternal city. They alone have a chance for peace, but only from time to time. Reviewed by: Garth Katner St. Norbert College De Pere, Wisconsin.
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