Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict
THE MILITARY IN MODERN TURKEY:
A LASTING POLITICAL FORCE
by Aira Chtena
In the Post-World War II era, Turkey has experienced a series of free and popular parliamentary elections that led to civilian democratic rule. The military, however, has intervened almost every ten years in the name of restoration of rule and order, and after fulfilling its duty, voluntarily handed power back to civilian hands. During the latter half of the 1980's a general consensus prevailed suggesting that the military has finally accepted civilian superiority over it, and has rendered itself incapable of reengaging in political affairs. In light of the recent developments, though, namely the removal of Necmettin Erbakan first from the premiership and then from the political scene for the next five years, and the ban on his Welfare Party (Refah), one is tempted to reconsider this rather optimistic view. In fact, the military has adhered to a recurring pattern of behavior to be traced throughout the four preceding decades. The generals intervene when there is a political crisis, then withdraw, and reintervene if another crisis emerges. The grounds of this behavior are to be found in the self assumed role of the Turkish army.
During the twentieth century, military interventions in politics occurred in most of the developing world, including Latin American, Arab, African and Asian countries. A common underlying condition in these countries was a high degree of political ineffectiveness and the failure of the civilian government to contain the army, creating a situation called praetorianism (Perlmutter, 1977). In modern praetorianism the military is prone to intervene in political life.
Rustow and Huntington suggest that the incentives leading to military interventions are not to be found in "the historical background of the armies," but in the nature of the army's interaction with the "political structure" in the context of political modernization (Rustow, 1967, p.175). Countries undergoing political modernization proceed ultimately and ideally towards a system where, on the one hand, the government is able to address effectively social, economic and political problems, and on the other hand, the people view the government as a legitimate source of authority, and therefore respect and obey it.
Military interventions are an outgrowth of one particular aspect of modernization, that is "the general politicization of social forces and institutions" in the absence of effective political institutions that could coordinate their interactions (Huntington, 1968, p.194). The increasing and uncontrolled involvement of agencies such as religious institutions, universities, bureaucracies, corporations and, of course, the army with overall political problems and not specific to their interests is due to the lack of "autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability" of political institutions (Huntington, 1968, p.194). The expansion of political participation that usually accompanies economic and social reforms in praetorian societies contributes to the chaos, because more social actors are added to a stage that has no director/mediator. In such an institutional vacuum, the social groups intervene in politics, and as each of them deploys its own device, the military resorts to the device of a coup.
The praetorian army can assume two different natures: that of a "ruler" or an "arbitrator" (Perlmutter, 1977, p.104). The ruler army, which is not the concern of this paper, ventures to alter the existing political order, doubts its legitimacy, and is unwilling to return executive power back to civilian hands. The arbitrator army, on the contrary, is deeply committed to the existing order, ready to leave office after a limited period of time during which it has restored law and order, has no intention to increase army power, is prone to continue to influence the civilian government, and is concerned about civilian retaliation. The army in this case is loyal and obedient to civilian rule even when the latter is rather disorganized, but does not threaten the existence of the state. The army is also authoritarian and curtails civil rights, but its presence is expected to be limited in time. The coup is treated as the last resort by an army that prefers to be a pressure group thereby minimizing the chances it will have to intervene physically.
The increasing degree of social complexity hinders the army "to exercise power effectively and to seize power successfully" (Huntington, 1968, p.229). As more social groups become more visible and participatory in political affairs, society becomes more differentiated and difficult for the military to manipulate. The military becomes "one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces," that have moreover developed methods of counteracting military action, through general strikes, for instance. Therefore, the degree of physical violence involved in a coup decreases, but it becomes more "virulent" in terms of the scope of arrests, trials, and censorship (Huntington, 1968, p.230). Moreover, military intervention can occur under the condition that the civilian and military institutions are "distinct," which is an inevitable effect of the modernization of society, division of labor, increase of governmental scope and mounting "complexity of warfare and administration" (Rustow, 1967, p.175). As society undergoes higher levels of differentiation soldiers are further removed from civilian roles.
Under such circumstances the military assumes the role of the guardian, the "purifier of the existing order" in response to political "corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion" (Huntington, 1968, p.225). The loss of the government's legitimacy and the presumed incapability of it to perform its tasks successfully are adequate incentives for the generals to intervene. The military can afterwards assume the role of "an informal, or even explicit umpire between competing political parties and groups" (Janowitz, 1977, p.83).
The guardian coup has only a "temporary" stabilizing effect in the political process (Huntington, 1968, 231). Soon after the coup, a division among the ranks of the military between radicals and moderates appears, especially over the issue of abandonment of power. The radicals wish to stay in power longer and reconstruct the political system. The moderates have short term goals and after eliminating the problems that prompted their intervention want to leave office. Therefore it is typical for coups to be threatened by the possibility of 'sub coups' within their ranks initiated by the radicals aiming at deposing the moderates that took power initially, or indeed experience such sub coups.
The Turkish army falls under the category of the guardian. As has been stated above, "the weaknesses of civilian institutions [bring] the military into the political stage" (Ward & Rustow, 1977, p.83). Turkey, though, even in the 1960's was not an institutionally weak state, so coups seemed puzzling at first glance. Turkey has had a long tradition (since 1950) of multi-party politics, and its political parties are "certainly well developed for a developing country" (Dodd, 1969, p.31). In addition, the army was and is highly professional, thus highly depoliticized through its military education and training (Huntington, 1991, p.243).
In the case of Turkey, even a superficial knowledge of the post-World-War II political and military history suggests that the military has not only intervened when a political crisis occurred in the form of a political stalemate, but also when Kemalist principles, especially that of secularism, have been threatened. In fact, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic in 1923, included in the country's constitution the military's role as the sole "defender and protector of the constitution and of republican and honest civilian rule," he basically legitimized the military's intervention in politics (Perlmutter, 1977, p.111).
Therefore, praetorianism in Turkey must be perceived as a state in which the military "specifically, exercises independent political power, either by using force or by threatening to do so" (Hale, 1994, p.305). Although the army's composition changes over time, it is possible to discern patterns in the way Turkey's military functions. In general, the Turkish military can be characterized as moderately conservative, because it tends to retain the existing order, but at the same time it does not hesitate to remedy the state's malfunctions.
The army that has assumed the role of the guardian is underpinned by two legacies: "that it is above politics and [that it should] prevent changes in the political system" (Huntington, 1991, p.232). These legacies pose a dilemma for the army's actions. The causes of military intervention cannot be disposed of only by exterminating people, since military intervention is not a "temporary and extraordinary disruption of the political system," but an almost inevitable part of the process of modernization. The army has to create such conditions and institutions that will not make it necessary for it to reintervene. It also has to minimize the retaliation prospect stemming from the party, whose administration the generals initially terminated. Therefore, the army has to remain in politics sometimes for longer than it wants and create viable or auxiliary administrative institutions, as the Turkish experience reveals, with the most prominent example being that of the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) after the 1960 coup.
In order to bring about a condition of political stability the army needs to engage in a process of transforming military intervention into "military participation" through the creation of political institutions and the gradual elimination of officers from civilian posts (Huntington, 1968, p.243). Such a process legitimizes the army's presence in the political arena, although in Turkey, Kemal legitimized their intervention in politics in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the generals after every coup have been worried about the legitimacy of their intervention.
After the praetorian army has seized power, it can decide among four courses of action regarding the future of the civilian government. The army can withdraw from the political scene, but refuse to allow new groups to become involved (the "return and restrict" option); stay in power and keep social groups involvement at a distance (the "retain and restrict" option); or remain in power and allow for broad participation on behalf of social groups (the "retain and expand" option) (Huntington, 1968, p. 233).
The fourth option is the one the Turkish military has followed by giving power back to civilian hands and allowing civilians to come back to power with new rules imposed upon them and under new leadership (the return and expand" option). Once civilian government has resumed power, Huntington wants it at least to promote 'proper' civil-military relations, that in effect means total removal of soldiers from the political scene (Huntington, 1991, p. 257). One way of achieving this goal is by indoctrinating professionalism as a value in the military cadres. Unfortunately for the politicians in Turkey it is precisely this high professionalism of the Turkish military that leads it to intervene. A high sense of duty to the Republic of Turkey and worship of Kemal largely reinforce the army's commitment to intervening.
According to Huntington another way of depoliticizing the army is the reorientation of its mission towards purely defense and military security issues. The Kurdish separatists in the southeast part of the country and Islam, which are considered the most imminent threats by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), though, have not hindered the generals from intervening in political affairs when deemed necessary.
The civilian government can also attempt to reorganize the top military personnel by appointing trusted people in powerful positions, and to restructure the military institution, by establishing for instance a Ministry of Defense. In Turkey no endeavor to put in practice the first guideline, that of controlling the staff of institutions by appointment, (if ever attempted) has been successful, and the fact that there is a Ministry of Defense does not mean a lot, since the Chief of the General Staff outranks the Minister of Defense.
The size and equipment of the military can also be curtailed in an effort to reduce the army's power. Turkey allegedly consented in such a decision by virtue of being a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but what is agreed upon on paper is not always put into practice. Some governments decide to reduce the importance of the military, while others provide the soldiers with more material benefits and emphasize their contributions. Turkey consistently has followed the latter approach, and the most recent example is provided by Erbakan who both granted an increase in the salary of the Armed Forces and praised them as "the apple of the Turkish people's collective eye" (Bruce, 1996, p. 7).
Despite the abundant evidence revealing a very powerful military institution in Turkey, that has made sure after every intervention to sustain a high degree of indirect power, there have developed theories defending the view that the military has instead weakened. One of them perceives Turkish politics as an interaction within the state elite of the civilian (intellectuals and bureaucrats) and military elite. Despite the fact that the Kemalist era (1920-50) is often viewed as a change from the Ottoman experience, the Ottoman elite politics were in fact continued during it, since the single-party Assembly of the Republic was dominated by military officials. (Table 1) Moreover, the elite perceived itself to be then "the true servants of a state above and autonomous from society, the sole guardians of public interest, and the chief agents of modernization" (Diamond, 1993, p. 252). Under Kemal (and until 1950), the ruling elite was extremely prestigious and enjoyed consensus, but already a counter elite was developing as a result of modernization and differentiation of society.
The argument that wants the military to have weakened traces the evolution of politics in Turkey, and the basic assertion is that although Turkish politics have been "elite politics [conducted by] elite actors, elite institutions, and [in] elite urban settings" this situation is not likely to continue in a modernizing Turkey (Diamond, 1993, p.247). The 1950 multi-party competition was viewed as the beginning of the emergence of new social groups in the political arena and the end of the unity of the state elite, that intentionally kept other social groups distanced from government. The Democratic Party came to power after having mobilized the periphery with goals such as "local initiative, free enterprise, relaxation of religious restrictions," and attracted businessmen, merchants, and local notables. Inevitably an "intraelite conflict" erupted that was overcome only with the 1960 military coup--a reaction against the Adnan Menderes government that was limiting freedom of speech (Diamond, (Ed.), 1993, p.252).
A "new and democratic" constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly in 1961 granting, indeed, civil liberties and social rights. Due to the liberalism of the 1961 constitution, the civilian elite was exposed to different ideologies and started to doubt Kemalism. The changing mood was epitomized in the 1961 general elections when the Republican People's Party (RPP), that was favored by the army, was defeated by the Justice Party (JP).
A more realistic view of the events than the above reveals that the army's attitude subsequent to the coup reflected the 'dilemma' in decisions; the army in this case created new institutions to provide for a 'healthier' democracy, so that it would not have to intervene again, but it also manipulated greatly the profile of the political life. The military's distrust of politicians and political parties, and the fear of the questioning of the intervention led them to influence the Parliament and retain power for longer than the military wanted.
The army, that had drafted the constitution, simultaneously established methods of checking the elected governmental bodies, staffed the House of Representatives with supporters of the regime and excluded largely the opposition (JP), and created the NSC. Interestingly, these actions were seen as consistent with the army's ultimate goal of a pluralistic and democratic society.
The military in Turkey was and is highly differentiated from the rest of society constituting "a separate community, rather than representing any one group in society," thus greatly retaining the characteristic observed during the Kemalist era (Hale, 1994, p.305). It is also a highly united structure whose links are further 'strengthened' by periodic military purges in the military ranks with the most recent happening in January 1998 and against Muslim fundamentalists. The fact that the cadets are indoctrinated as being superior to the rest of society has a tremendous implication: an "ambiguous attitude towards democratic politics" (Hale, 1994, p.321). The army believes in democracy, as a form of government, but it also finds it perfectly legitimate to intervene, when the Republic is threatened with downfall. The army exercises an arbitrary prerogative; that of deciding on what situation calls for its intervention.
Democracy historically has been approached in Turkey as "an end in itself and not as a means to other ends" by the elite apparatus in general (Rustow & Erickson, 1991, p.196). The elite viewed democracy as the only means of surviving in a modern world and hoped to achieve it by replacing Islam with "reason" (Rustow & Erickson, 1991, p.192). The state elite came to be very decisive in the absence of active social groups that they deliberately excluded from power. Primary concern was given to the preservation of law and order, modernization, and "exigencies of interstate relations" (Rustow & Erickson, 1991, p.203). Political institutions such as political parties were indeed created, but they had no constructive relationship with social groups. The latter had only a "clientelistic" relationship with the government based on an exchange of favors for votes leaving the state elites to run the country uncontrolled (Rustow and Erickson, 1991, p.204).
An alternative view of the events above is presented by civil society theorists who want the tradition of strong state elites to be complemented with a hundred and fifty year old struggle to curtail state power. They argue that the transition to civilian government was chosen not because the army is the guardian of democratic politics, but because the generals have been unable to cope with increased civil opposition to their rule.
Accordingly, the 1960 coup had been welcomed as the only means to bring change in government, because under the old constitution no oppositional voice had any particular impact in the Parliament. The 1961 constitution came to remedy the weakness of democracy, that is the absence of means of controlling the "tyranny of the majority." The Constitutional Court, the Senate of the Republic, the Supreme Council of Judiciary, and NSC, that were created were seen as "the control valves of a new power balance" (Norton, 1996, p.93).
During the decade of the 1970's the absence of a political center, the weakness of the Presidential Office and the inability to exercise judicial power led to social and political disarray. While the 1971 coup was largely seen as an attempt to contain the rising political left and violence, the 1980 coup was against the social forces that were responsible for an average daily loss of twenty lives in street fighting between the left and right political parties.
The 1982 constitution banned autonomous institutions and links among them, and gave the power to the government to violate rights and liberties under certain conditions. During the 1980-83 period, political parties were shut down and their leaders were removed from politics for up to ten years. As a result "a highly polarized society had become depoliticized and silenced" (Norton, 1996, p.94).
Despite these measures, though, in the 1983 democratic elections the central issue contrary to the military's efforts and wishes was "alternative sources of power to state authority" (Norton, 1996, p.95). Moreover the fall of the Soviet Union challenged the supremacy of a strong state, and demonstrated that it was not a panacea to all problems. Also, the "domestic politics climate [became more] open and liberal," when Turkey became interested in joining the European Union (EU). Quite a few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were established for the promotion of human rights, trade unions, women's groups, labor unions, student associations, and peace groups driving the number of active NGOs up to about fifty-five thousand (Norton, 1996, p.104).
What these civil theorists failed to recognize was that the army, after all three coups, did indeed return power to civilians, but it "continued to hover in their wings" by various means deploying in this way the function of a guardian (Rustow, 1967, p.194). A short review of the military-political interaction will help illustrate this point more convincingly.
Before 1960 and after it had helped establish the Republican People's Party (RPP), the army was completely isolated from politics. The coup of May 27, 1960 came as a reaction to the collapse of parliamentary government. In absence of the "sad incidents [and prospect of] fratricide" it is highly unlikely that the coup would have taken place (Hale, 1994, p.119). As late as two days before the coup, the generals were favorably inclined to the issuing of a "pronunciamento" asking for the evacuation of the office (Hale, 1994, p.121).
Menderes had succeeded in emerging as the Prime Minister of the 1954 general elections by means of silencing the oppositional political voices through censorship and police control. In an attempt to remain in power for one more term he introduced a legislation in Parliament that would presumably lead to more censorship of the press and the banning of the RPP. As a result, the country lapsed in "a state of war without actual hostilities" from 1957 to 1960 (Bienen, 1968, p.132). The army intervened on May 27, 1960 only after almost three years of severe political unrest and only when the country was very close to experiencing civil war.
After seizing power, the army established the National Unity Community (NUC) consisting of generals, economists, academics, and businessmen that acted in the place of the non-existent Turkish Grand National Assembly. Indeed, on November 29, 1961 the NUC was dissolved and the civilian government resumed power as promised. After the coup, the military adopted a dubious role. On the one hand, the generals wanted to disengage quickly from politics, but on the other hand, they wanted to "hold the ring for the political activity of the parties around inflamed issues" (Bienen, 1968, p.137).
They were also confronted with two inconveniences: the questioning of the legitimacy of the 27th May intervention and the fate of parliamentary democracy. So, in order to cure the first vice, Menderes was executed because he was seen as a prominent threat who would seek revenge if he ever came back to power, the Democratic Party (DP) was outlawed, and the power of the pro-Democratic opposition was curtailed. As far as the second issue was concerned, the elections of 1961 led to a stalemate. The military decided therefore not to exit the political arena, but forced instead the political parties to reach an agreement, because first it distrusted parties, and then it feared that the DP's successor, the Justice Party (JP), would charge it with the execution of Menderes and challenge the legitimacy of the coup.
In between these events, the army also experienced a split in its ranks. Its thirty-eight members were split into radicals and moderates, the first being mainly young, ambitious middle ranking officers that wanted to remain in power for longer time and eventually emulate the one-party regime of a Soviet type in the 1920's. They were suppressed, though, by the moderates, that is the generals and the majority of the colonels that were willing to leave office "at the earliest opportunity" (Hale, 1994, p.133). A purge and the 1964 Cyprus crisis brought consensus back to the barracks.
On March 12, 1971 the second overthrow of an elected government occurred, because of "anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest" (Hale, 1994, p.184). The government had failed to deal with terrorism and disorder stemming from conflict between Marxist and ultra-right forces, and doomed social and economic reforms (Hale, 1994). The army this time issued "a memorandum" addressed to President Sunay and as a result Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel left office. According to reports, if Demirel had not resigned, the army would not have been ready to implement the last of the tripartite memorandum that threatened "to take over the administration directly" (Hale, 1994, p.194). This ambivalent attitude reaffirms the military's desire to remain insulated from politics, and at the same time its sense of obligation to intervene in the name of the constitution. Moreover, the generals did not want to repeat 1960, because it would project a bad international image--comparable to those of Greece and Pakistan at the time.
The military regime stayed in power until 1973, when presidential elections were scheduled. The customary succession of the Chief of the General Staff to the post of President was challenged on the grounds that it "would suck the army permanently into the political whirlpool" (Hale, 1994, p.206). The Parliament was not willing to conform to the army's preferences over the presidential candidate either. Consequently, it consented to have a presidential candidate that would be neutral and not "known as an opponent of the 27 May and 12 March interventions." This Presidential incident was viewed by many as a military defeat inflicted by the civilian government on the military. In fact, the army itself was divided on the issue of succession.
In the elections of 1973, Prime Minister Ecevit (RPP) emerged as the winner without a majority in Parliament. The army was not in a position to press for the coalition it would prefer, that is one between the RPP and the JP. The final outcome was a coalition between RPP and Erbakan's National Salvation Party. Cleavages in the coalition led to Ecevit's resignation that left the Prime Minister seat vacant, and Turkey on the verge of its "longest governmental crisis in its modern history" (Hale, 1994, p.220).
The deterioration process was accelerated by the sharp reoccurrence of "political violence," that is assassinations, kidnappings, and robberies (Hale, 1994, p.224). Terrorism came from groups closely affiliated with Marxist ideas struggling against extreme-right organizations; from formerly suppressed religious conflicts finding the opportunity to emerge, such as the orthodox Sunni sect of Islam versus the minority Shiites; and lastly from the Kurdish separatists challenging the Turkish state especially in the southeast part of the country.
Demirel and Ecevit instead of cooperating against the chaos, turned against each other. The civilian government failed to reach a coalition, and caused a further political stalemate and a constitutional crisis, when it proved incapable of nominating a presidential candidate. In addition, Erbakan's challenge to secularism was interpreted as an offense to the armed forces and Kemal's legacy (Hale, 1994, p.237).
Although during the 1973-80 period, the parliament was malfunctioning, the army did not exhibit any signs of potential intervention, but stayed instead voluntarily in the shadow. This reaction could be partially explained because of the embarrassing experience of 1971-73, during which the army's image was greatly impaired by the excessive violence executed under Martial Law and by the failure to implement their social and economic reforms, and of the 20 July 1974 Cyprus invasion that kept the military occupied.
On September 12, 1980 the coup that took place only after "the collapse of law and order" and after a "warning letter" had been issued just as in 1971 was welcomed with relief. However, unlike their predecessors, the generals now paid more attention to short term goals such as recovering the economy, halting terrorism, and restoring civilian government as soon as possible instead of pursuing "far-reaching plans for social and economic reform" exhibiting therefore even greater commitment to their guardian role (Hale, 1994, p.246).
The generals chose a civilian cabinet "to carry on the day-to-day administration of the country [and staffed it with] non-party technocrats" (Hale, 1994, p.247). Immediately after the coup General Evren discouraged all armed forces from engaging in politics, first because there was the fear of a counter coup, and second because of international pressure under NATO, the US, and the EU. Before returning power to civilian hands, though, the generals created a new constitution in 1982 that undoubtedly guaranteed the prominence of the army, and gave rise to fears that "an army regime in mufti and not a real democracy" would be imposed (Hale, 1994, p.258).
A Presidential Council (comprising junta members) was created to exist for six years, and advise the President. The NSC was given the power to virtually form laws:
The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity of the country and the peace and security of society (Turkish Constitution, Part 3, Section III, Paragraph B).
The Martial Law Act was amended, and gave the army more power. The generals could now carry out crude censorship, ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend newspapers and other publications, and dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed "undesirable without right of appeal." This had the desirable effect of minimizing terrorism, but at the same time gave rise to attitudes not very compatible with democratic norms, such as torture, human rights violations, excessive violence, and university restrictions.
Political parties mushroomed despite the strict rules prior to their establishment, so the military, fearing that no party would win a majority, effectively drew out of the race all but three parties: the Nationalist Democrats, the Populists and the Motherland Party. The military's view of democracy apparently did not allow for minority or radical voices to be heard. Turgut Ozal ran for President and was the first civilian to get elected on October 31, 1989. In the 1991 general elections, Demirel's True Path Party (TPP) won, but had to form a coalition. By process of elimination, Demirel chose Inonu's Social Democrat Populist Party, and was later blessed with the vote of confidence from the Parliament. Although Demirel had threatened to depose Ozal from the presidency once elected, he resorted to a "live and let live" relationship with the President, once he ascended to power and found out that he was unable to amend the constitution.
The fact that the coalition process succeeded this time (unlike in 1971) was either a sign of "growing maturity of Turkish democracy" or a sign of the party leaders having "learnt the lessons of the past" (Hale, 1994, p.286). Lastly, there was a smooth transition from the crisis of Ozal's death in 1993 to Demirel's succession, and Tansu Ciller being elected in the latter's position. Both events discredited fears of a coup.
Moreover, the armed forces started to distance themselves from direct intervening in "day-to-day- administration," and seemed to alter their position as a "semi-autonomous" institution by the early 1990's as a result of several events (Hale, 1994, p.287). The Nationalist Democratic Party did not attract as much public support as the generals had hoped for so it diminished in visibility; Provisional Article 4 giving massive power to the NSC was removed and the Council seemed to be committed primarily to protecting secularism from a resurgence of Islam that was government instigated; and Demirel and Inonu, although in the black list of the army, did eventually reenter the arena.
In addition a series of tokens of greater political tolerance appeared: people arrested for their political activities in the past were freed; Turkey's biggest trade confederation (Turk-Is) started commenting on political issues; trade unions started striking; and human rights became an issue. In addition, in April 1991 the law for the suppression of terrorism was ratified in Parliament allowing among others for opinions in favor of communism or Kurdish nationalism to rise freely (Hale, 1994). Lastly, the handling of the Gulf War crisis in January 1992 suggested also that the civilian government was taking over even traditional military areas, such as defense matters, because the Chief of the General Staff resigned instead of sending an ultimatum, when President Ozal changed the original plan of action.
The civilian government seemed to be winning over the military establishment, although still it had not fully consolidated its power over the army. Possible explanations of the army's submissive attitude were sought in an international environment not welcoming military regimes, or in the fact that Demirel decided in 1991 to pursue a coalition with Inonu and not Erbakan who would have agitated the army. These developments gave the impression that the generals "would become the servants of an elected government" (Hale, 1994, p.290).
In the latter half of the 1990's, though, one can dismiss all of the previous talks of a decline in importance of the military in Turkey, and treat them only as instances of the typical and expected withdrawal of the military from politics. As the recent events in Turkish politics illustrate the army not only has lost absolutely no prominence, but is ready to intervene bluntly and overtly in order to protect the Republic.
In December 1995, Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party came first with 21.4 per cent of the popular vote in the general elections, and Turkey faced another parliamentary crisis, since a coalition needed to be established. The initial thoughts and talks of a coalition between Erbakan and Mesut Yilmaz of the Motherland Party (MP) were quickly abandoned after a strong opposition appeared within the Motherland Party. There is also evidence that the army was operating backstage in support of a coalition between Yilmaz and Ciller of the True Path Party (TPP), and was issuing "discreet reminders about the importance of a secular state" ("Turkey: A Fundamental Shift?", 1996).
Taking for granted that there was the fear that an Islamic Party in power might substitute constitutional law with religious law, the army greeted with relief the Yilmaz and Ciller coalition on March 3, 1996. There was the widespread sentiment that this coalition "[might] have saved the army a fourth intervention" (Lyster, 1996, p.20). The fact that Ciller and Yilmaz put aside their personal antipathy and formed what was euphemistically called "Motherpath" can be seen both as a sign of goodwill to EU's "pressure for economic and democratic reform," and as a strategic move to avoid another coup.
Eventually, though, a mutual personal dislike between Yilmaz and Ciller led to a coalition of the latter with Welfare's Erbakan in early July 1996, which was given the vote of confidence. The signs of moderation in his inauguration speech, and Erbakan's plans for raising the salaries of civil workers and especially of the soldiers, were taken as a proof of a working parliamentary system (Doxey, 1996). Nevertheless, the generals showed another sign of weariness when in July of 1996 they ordered a purge in the military ranks for "reactionary activities," like Islamic fundamentalism (Bruce, 1996, p.7).
The fact that the coalition between Yilmaz and Ciller failed, even though the army supported it, suggested that the army had lost its tight grip on politics. But, an incident in Sincan, a small town near Ankara, was enough to cause the generals to dispatch 30 tanks and armored cars and arrest the town's Welfare mayor who had not criticized calls for a return to an Islamic way of life made by the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey in 1997. The charge was framed as "violation of Turkey's constitution," but the whole incident was downplayed as a "routine maneuver" (Doxey, 1997, p.12).
The military still plays a dominant role, especially through the NSC that is run by the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs "under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic" (Turkish Constitution, Part 3, Section III, Paragraph B). The NSC still does not hold press conferences, and basically is not accountable to anyone. The Chief of the General Staff outranks civil ministers including the Minister of Defense. The army has also extended its influence in judiciary by setting up "special military style courts," and conducted its own foreign policy by approaching, for instance, Israel while Erbakan visited Iran, Iraq and Libya (Rouleau, 1996, p.70).
On March 1, 1997 the NSC launched what was characterized as a "soft coup"; it issued a warning stating 20 "directives" to strengthen secularism that the government should take ("Turkey's Generals Draw a Line in the Sand," 1997; "Turkey's Troubles," 1997). They aimed at curtailing the number of participants in religious training programs, controlling the sphere of action of "illegal Muslim sects," implementing the existing restrictions on Islamic dress, investigating the revenue sources (Islamic owned businesses) of Refah, and halting the funding of Turkish students abroad "who engage in Islamist agitation" (Doxey, 1997, p.12). Otherwise, although not explicitly stated, the soldiers would intervene for the fourth time.
Erbakan complied after protesting that "in Turkey governments are formed in Parliament, not in the NSC." Had he not complied, an intervention would have probably occurred since the TAF regard the Islamic fundamentalists and the outlawed Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) as the most imminent threats. Indeed the generals, confessed that a "slow moving putsch [was] underway" only to be abandoned, if the government shifted attitude or left office (Sariibrahimoglu, 1997, p.5).
In early June 1997, the latter phase of the "soft coup" occurred, and that was the ousting of Erbakan from his office with the charges of "undermining the secular basis of Turkey's modern republic and its pro-Western stance in foreign and military affairs." In May, fifty-eight members of the armed forces were dismissed for being "involved in illegal activities with fundamentalist organizations" ("Turkish Generals Purge Pro-Islamic Officers," 1997, p.A4). Before resorting to this action, the generals had been deciding on defense matters such as the attack against the Kurds in Iraq. They were also infuriated when Erbakan would not reduce the number of religious schools and private Koran schools (Kinzer, 1997).
In November 1997 Turkey's public prosecutor brought Refah to the Constitutional Court on the charges of being "a rallying point for antisecular activities." Although the evidence presented was criticized as "pretty thin," on January 16, 1997 Erbakan, five of his cabinet members and one mayor were removed from politics for the next five years. The Turkish High Court banned Erbakan's party on the basis that it promoted a "subversive agenda," and was ultimately aiming at overturning secularism and introducing Islam, thus going "against the principles of the secular republic" ("What's the Turkish Struggle?", 1997, p.62).
The Turkish army demonstrated its peculiar attitude towards democracy once again. It claimed to be so "committed to defending democracy that it uses means that in many countries would be considered undemocratic," and it is indeed seen by at least some secularists as a "democratic pressure group" (Kinzer, 1997, p.A1). It also forcefully exhibited its commitment to the basic tenets of the Constitution, and especially to that declaring the Turkish Republic to be secular. The army's handling of Erbakan and his party becomes particularly interesting, if one is to accept the literature claiming that conditions in today's Turkey do not provide a fertile soil for the establishment of an Islamic state.
Synoptically, it is clear that the Turkish Army has conformed to its guardian role for almost half a century. It has become over time increasingly reluctant to physically seize power, but is very determined to strike down real or perceived threats to the constitutional integrity. The military remains the most respected, feared, powerful and ruthless institution in Turkish politics. However, the lapse of time and the changing face of the international community have incurred a difference; the army prefers to form coalitions, and control political life from backstage.
The West has played a catalyst role in moderating slightly the military's performance, but the Turkish army is highly unlikely to lose its importance. This reality is rather alarming since the final act has not been played yet. The Welfare Party just recently changed its name to 'Virtue,' and elected a former ally of Erbakan as its leader, while the Public Prosecutor explicitly prohibited the existence of any party resembling Refah.
© Aira Chtena
Aira Chtena is a political science major at Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin.
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